Symmetry, Rational Abilities, and the Ought-Implies-Can Principle
Invited discussion of D. K. Nelkin, Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2011)
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Invited discussion of D. K. Nelkin, Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2011)
This chapter argues against the claim that morally ignorant wrongdoers are open to blame only if they are culpable for their ignorance, and argues against a version of skepticism about moral responsibility that depends on this claim being true. On the view defended, the attitudes involved in blame are typically responses to the features of an action that make it objectionable or unjustifiable from
I argue that it is possible to prevent (and to be praiseworthy for preventing) an unwelcome outcome that had no chance of occurring. I motivate this position by constructing examples in which it makes sense to explain the non-occurrence of a certain outcome by referring to a particular agent's intentional and willing behavior, and yet the non-occurrence of the outcome in question was ensured by fa
Invited discussion of G. Sher, Who Knew?: Responsibility Without Awareness
In April of 2004, about a year after the start of the Iraq War, a story broke in the American media about the abuse of Iraqi detainees by American soldiers at the Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad.1 From the beginning, editorialists and science writers noted affinities between what happened at Abu Ghraib and Philip Zimbardo’s 1971 Stanford Prison Experiment.2 Zimbardo’s experiment is part of a bod